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Discrimination Within the Family
The Treatment of Daughters and Sons
Paul J. Taubman 
University of Pennsylvania
My topic is the comparative parental treatment of daughters and sons 
and whether any unequal treatment should be labeled "discrimination." 
I have chosen such a strange topic because economists find it difficult 
to explain why a freely functioning, competitive market would allow 
equally skilled employees to receive unequal pay for equal work. Yet, 
as summarized below, such a situation seems to exist between men and 
women. Economists like to argue, therefore, that nonmarket institutions 
such as the school system or the family have produced daughters and 
sons who are not equally skilled in some dimension not yet measured 
by researchers. This paper will cast some doubt on this conclusion.
I first sketch out the historical path of the ratio of female to male wages 
under the assumption that discrimination in the labor market is defined 
as equally qualified men and women not receiving equal pay. Deter 
mining that men and women are equally skilled, however, is a hard task 
empirically.
I then explore the reasons why economists find it difficult to explain 
how discrimination can persist in the long run in markets that are com 
petitive. Hence, I next examine families to see if we can observe parents 
treating daughters and sons differently and thereby creating unequally 
skilled children. In doing this, I examine studies that quantify some 
aspects of family environment that may affect subsequent performance 
in the labor market. I do not, however, cover many psychological aspects 
such as aggressiveness or submissiveness, since they are not 
characteristics studied by economists. Finally, I provide a definition of 
discrimination within the family and discuss what is known on the topic.
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Labor Market Treatment
In a labor market without discrimination, equally qualified men and 
women would receive the same compensation for the same work. Many 
people, therefore, treat as evidence of labor market discrimination un 
equal pay for workers with the same measured qualifications. Sometimes 
these studies compare wages for the same occupation, though this ig 
nores the question of whether discrimination operates by reducing ac 
cess to some occupations for women. In any event, qualifications are 
an imperfect measure of either work or effort.
Even insuring that people have the same qualifications is a tricky 
business. Sometimes "equally qualified" is defined by looking at specific 
age and education groups. Sometimes not even such crude adjustments 
are made. There are other variables that have not been used at all by 
economists in defining equally qualified groups. Loehlin and Nichols 
(1976, p. 11), for example, present average scores for female and male 
high school students for various components of the California Personality 
Inventory. There are noticeable gender differences on items such as 
"social presence" or "communicality."
Labor market differentials between women and men have a long history. 
For example, Leviticus 27: 1-4 indicates that female slaves sold for about 
60 percent of the price of male slaves. 1 It is also possible to reach fur 
ther back in time. The Museum of the University of Pennsylvania has 
a large collection of Sumerian commercial records baked in clay. Some 
economic historian might find it interesting to calcula.e a "weighty" 
average of male and female slave prices for this civilization.
For the U.S., most attention has focused on the post-World War II 
period. However, Goldin (1990) has examined developments in the labor 
market for women back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. She 
finds that the ratio of female to male wages was a bit less than .5 around 
1900. In the 1950s and 1960s, this ratio was about .6. More recently, 
Smith and Ward (1989) show it has risen to about .65.
In judging the level and the time pattern in this ratio, several issues 
must be kept in mind. First, since 1950, the percentage of nonelderly
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married women participating in the labor force has more than doubled, 
reaching 60 percent in recent years. It is quite possible that women 
workers today have different innate and acquired skills from the women 
workers of the 1950s.
Smith and Ward (1989) have calculated the differences in education 
and experience for all and for working men and women.2 The working 
women are not a random draw from the female population. Smith and 
Ward (p. 12) indicate that among workers over the period 1940 to 1970, 
"women on average, lost almost a year of education and gained only 
half a year of market experience" compared to male workers. However, 
for the population at large, the present female and male labor force is 
generally more knowledgeable than the population in 1950, though there 
have been intermediate periods where the population has had greater 
knowledge than today's workers.3 Comparable numbers on knowledge 
levels for the people who work are not available.
The life cycle pattern of labor force participation of women complicates 
the analysis and the interpretation of the female/male wage ratio. To 
understand this, I must digress to explain the concept of general on-the- 
job training. Such training, which can be provided by parents, schools, 
and firms, increases an individual's (marginal) productivity and wages 
at many jobs. In a competitive world, all these jobs should pay the same 
wage; hence, any firm that provides training cannot recapture expen 
ditures on training through reduction in future wages. Therefore, the 
person being trained must pay for these expenditures now via tuition 
or reduced current wages.
It is possible that the influx of women into the labor force in the 1950s, 
60s, and 70s lowered the average amount (stock) of training of women 
in the labor force in some years, since there were so many new workers 
at many ages.4
Two other life cycle-related events are important. Often when a child 
is born, the mother takes formal, temporary maternity leave or drops 
out of the labor force for a more extended time.5 Since any worker's 
return to general training occurs in the form of higher wages when work 
ing, younger women contemplating having children may be reluctant to 
choose positions with higher training components and with lower current
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and higher future earnings. (Of course, this also implies that, when begin 
ning a labor market career, women should receive greater wages than 
men, which we don't observe.) Moreover, Mincer and Ofek (1982) in 
dicate that women who return to the labor force after being out more 
than one year receive lower wages than when they left work, with this 
differential increasing with the amount of time spent out of the labor 
market. However, they argue that this deterioration is quickly overcome. 
Still, a larger increase in reentrants will drag the female/male wage ratio 
down.
Suppose this gender wage ratio is less than 1. Is this an indication 
that sexual discrimination exists in the labor market? As my previous 
discussion indicates, the answer is "not necessarily," because men and 
women could have engaged in different previous on-the-job training pro 
grams. In addition, they can have different skills or may have selected 
jobs with different attributes that trade off for wages. Bound, Griliches, 
and Hall (1986), using a sample of brothers and sisters, find that there 
are unobserved but latent family effects on schooling, IQ, and earnings, 
and that these effects "are sex blind" (p. 97). Lucas (1977) finds substantial 
wage rate tradeoffs for nonpecuniary job characteristics with some dif 
ferences by gender. These differences explain a portion of the gender 
wage differential.
Moreover, average differences in observed characteristics, such as years 
of work experience, account for much of the observed difference in the 
wage ratio (see Neumark 1988). Corcoran and Duncan (1979) find that 
completed years of training on current job and "other work history" 
explain about 40 percent of the wage gap observed in 1976. Yet the ratio 
adjusted for differences in the average of observed characteristics is still 
less than 1.
In spite of this consistent finding, many economists are reluctant to 
label this difference as "labor market discrimination." Let me sketch 
out why.6 We distinguish three types of discrimination: employer in 
which the boss suffers pain or disutility from employing women or non- 
whites in a job; employee in which one type of worker suffers pain 
or disutility from laboring with workers of another demographic type; 
and consumer in which the buyer of a product suffers pain or disutility
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from buying a product made or sold by someone from another ethnic 
or gender group.
For simplicity, assume that all workers have the same skill level and 
that there is full employment. In the employer model with fixed capital, 
there can initially be discrimination with the disfavored group receiv 
ing a smaller wage. The gender wage differential must be set so that 
both female and male labor markets clear at the going wage rates. The 
amount of the wage differential will depend on how much the employer 
of the last woman needs to be compensated (for the disutility he incur 
red) by reduced female wages to hire her. This same gender differential 
will be paid for all equally skilled women, since they are assumed to 
be interchangeable.
However, suppose some employers have less gender distaste and are 
more willing to hire women. The more women capitalists hire, the greater 
will be their profits, since women workers are hired at a lower wage 
than equally skilled men. In the long run, these more profitable employers 
can expand their firms as long as lenders and investors only care about 
interests and profits. This will increase the demand for the female labor 
force. Bigger bigots will have lower profits and their capital will shrink 
over time. As long as some people aren't discriminators, the long-run 
equilibrium is one where all equally skilled people are paid the same 
wage for the same work.
Employee discrimination also can be found in the short run, but if 
mixed workforces cause the employer to pay higher wages, competitors 
can be expected to set up gender "pure" plants. Since by assumption 
all workers are equally skilled, equilibrium requires equal pay at 
segregated plants.
Consumer discrimination may be viable in both the short and long 
run, but this type of discrimination is not thought to be very important 
for the economy as a whole. For most products, you don't know who 
made a good. Of course, you may know from whom you bought it, but 
retail trade, which includes more than sales, accounts for less than 5 
percent of our jobs and about 12 percent of civilian employees are in 
sales at all levels of trade.
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Leaving aside consumer discrimination, economists have a difficult 
time explaining why discrimination should be found in labor markets 
in the long run. Wage differentials, however, are found between men 
and women with the same education and years of job experience, though 
these differentials have narrowed in recent years. Several possible ex 
planations are: economists don't know how to model the labor market; 
the labor market isn't competitive; adjustments to eliminate discrimination 
take a very long time; or people with the same length of job experience 
and years of schooling are not equally skilled, perhaps because of treat 
ment within the family.
As a practicing economist I am willing to reject the first reason out 
of hand, and I note that numerous studies have generated results consis 
tent with economic models of the labor market. While Akerlof (1985) 
has shown how discrimination could persist in a noncompetitive labor 
market, it is difficult to believe that such noncompetitiveness is per 
vasive enough to have a major impact on wage ratios.
It is possible that the adjustment process is very slow. For example, 
Margo (1986) shows that a child's literacy depends strongly on the parents' 
literacy. The time since emancipation in this country a date when less 
than 20 percent of blacks could read (Smith 1984, p. 691) may not be 
long enough to have made blacks and whites functionally literate to the 
same degree, given this intergenerational link. However, if adjustment 
takes this long, economic theorems about the long run lose much of their 
interest.
The possibility that differential treatment in the family produces sons 
and daughters with different quantity and quality of skills and human 
capital remains and is the focus for the remainder of this paper.
The Role of the Family
Parents can be very important in shaping the socioeconomic outcomes 
of their offspring. For example, among same sex identical twins about 
50 years old, the correlation in earnings is nearly .6 (even with no 
allowance for measurement error).7 On measures more closely attuned
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to childhood, the identical twin correlations are even higher, ranging 
up to .95 for IQ.
These twin correlations occur because of both genetic and environmen 
tal linkages. I will not dwell at great length on the genetic linkage or 
its measurement though I will note that I have generated some (con 
troversial) estimates that suggest that genes explain much of the individual 
difference (variance) in schooling and earnings.8 It is of more impor 
tance to consider how much parents can influence their children through 
the provision of their environment. Of course, if all effects are either 
genetic or environmental, then it must follow that environmental effects 
are "surprisingly small," but they are nowhere near zero.
In some samples it is possible to divide environmental effects into those 
"common" to siblings and those that are specific to a child.9 The available 
literature suggests that the "common" environmental component, with 
which no parental discrimination can be associated, has limited impact 
on the across-family variance in socioeconomic and psychological 
outcomes though most studies measure this common environment for 
brothers. See Behrman et al. (1980), Behrman, Pollak and Taubman 
(1989), Scarr and Weinberg (1976), and Tellegen et al. (1988), which 
use a variety of techniques and samples. Individual specific environ 
ment can be provided both in and outside of the family. The individual 
environment provided by the family could differ by gender and make 
daughters and sons unequally skilled.
I next examine what we know about differential provision of environ 
ment by child's gender and then refine by definition of parental 
discrimination.
The Treatment of Daughters and Sons
Smith (1984, p. 687), using published Census documents,10 presents 
estimates of average years of schooling completed for white and black 
males and females. His table 3 is reproduced (with permission of the 
AER) as my table 1. As shown in this table, through the 1916 to 1920 
birth cohort, white women have up to .5 of a year more education than
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white men. From then through the 1946-50 birth cohort, white men 
(many more of whom would have been eligible for education benefits 
from the G.I. Bill) have an advantage over white women of less than 
.25 of a year of schooling. My updated results from the 1980 Census 
suggest a slight advantage for white women in the next age 
cohort 1955-1959. Black women have generally had about .5 of a year 
more education in most birth cohorts than black men.
Table 1










































































































SOURCE Smith 1984, p 687
The differences in any birth cohort are small and in this dimension 
of human capital there seems to be no presumption of gender discrimina 
tion by parents. However, the use of averages does not speak fully to
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the issue. Until about 1980, a larger fraction of men than women went 
to college. See Goldin (1990). While this may indicate a greater paren 
tal financial contribution to sons, it should be noted that after finishing 
school, daughters typically work before marriage. If she lives with her 
parents and contributes funds, the family is foregoing some of this poten 
tial income while the daughter finishes high school.
Parents may also affect children's future prospects by sending them 
to private and parochial precollege schools. 11 Table 2 presents infor 
mation on the percentage of each sex who attended public school in 
various years. Only small differences exist with no clear gender pat 
tern. Similar results hold when education is divided into elementary 
and secondary levels. Also, the number of female and male students 
in Catholic schools are about equal.
Table 2
Percentage of All Students of Each Gender 
3 to 34 Years Old Enrolled in Public Schools















I have also estimated a logit model, in which I distinguish public, 
Catholic, and other private high schools, for a 1957 Wisconsin High 
School senior sample. While IQ, living in a rural community, and paren 
tal income have highly significant coefficients, the coefficients on gender 
are very small and highly insignificant.
Parents can support their children at college and influence their col 
lege choices via nonmonetary means. In the Ivy League, less than half 
of the undergraduate body is female, though the female percentage may 
be rising. At the University of Pennsylvania, which has an undergraduate 
nursing school, engineering school, business school, and college of arts 
and sciences, the percentage of female freshmen matriculants has risen
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from about 40 percent in 1978 to about 45 percent in 1988. Penn's ad 
missions are need-blind. About half of Penn's students are not eligible 
for financial aid because of own and parental income and wealth. Women 
account for 42 percent of the freshmen students receiving aid in 1988.
In interpreting these results, note that Penn admits about a fourth of 
its freshmen solely on the basis of academic standing. The remainder 
are admitted on a combination of academic and nonacademic creden 
tials, but as far as I am aware gender is not a criteria of diversity. Thus, 
judging by Penn, there is a slight tendency for daughters to have a 
marginally smaller chance to attend an Ivy League school, and those 
daughters who attend come from slightly wealthier families. The 
available evidence, e.g., Taubman (1975), which is based solely on men, 
indicates that people who went to schools where students have higher 
SAT scores and better facilities have greater income, even after con 
trolling for own intelligence, job preferences, and a huge number of 
family background variables.
While years of schooling is the easiest data to obtain about daughters 
and sons, some additional information is known. For example, Behrman 
and Taubman (1986) indicate that daughters who attend college receive 
$315 per year more parental monetary support than sons in college.
Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1989) have begun to examine a new 
sample of 1985 Pennsylvania high school seniors, which was provided 
to them by Professor M. Tierney. This sample matches records from 
applications to the Pennsylvania Higher Education Authority (PHEA) 
(by Pennsylvania residents) with records from the Education Testing 
Service (ETS). The PHEA data include parents' (or if they are indepen 
dent their own) federal income tax returns, the school they are attend 
ing, and the cost of attendance net of scholarships, and also net of loans 
provided by the federal and state government. 12
Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman examine the college choices of sons 
and daughters. Schools in the sample can be characterized by type, such 
as private high-cost, out-of-state, etc., and by dollar amount of costs 
before and after scholarships. In logit equations for type of school, there 
are strong effects of parental income, SAT scores, and ethnicity. There 
are also significant but very small effects of gender in a sample where
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women are 53 percent of the total. The largest difference is no more 
than 10 percent, and sons only have an advantage for Pennsylvania state- 
owned schools 13 and community colleges, which are the inexpensive 
choices. However, the female percentage is generally smaller than the 
53 percent found in the samples.
They also examine the amount spent on colleges. Tuition (gross and 
net of scholarships and loans) is positively related to parental income 
and to the child's gender. Girls expend 2 to 3 percent more, even with 
parental income held constant. Hence, there is little overall difference 
in the type of college attended by the 10,000 students except in the greater 
attendance of men in the low-cost groups given above. This is at variance 
with the Penn experience.
Parents can contribute more than money to prepare their children for 
adulthood. Parental time, examples, and emotional support can all help 
determine the amount of human capital a child takes to the labor market. 
Economists have not tried to measure the other two elements, but they 
have done a little work on parental time inputs. Leibowitz (1974) has 
used the data in the Terman sample of California children in school 
around 1920. However, these individuals were in the top 2 percent of 
the IQ distribution, and it is not clear how her results generalize to the 
whole IQ distribution, the rest of the country, or more recent genera 
tions. Nevertheless, parental "hometime" spent with the child was about 
the same for daughters and sons (p. S131).
More recent time budget studies such as those summarized in Hill 
(1985) make a distinction between fathers and mothers, but not usually 
between daughters and sons. However, Hill and Stafford (1980), using 
a detailed time budget study, note that (p. 221) "college-educated 
mothers devoted more time to the care of their preschool daughters than 
to their preschool sons, while the converse was true for those mothers 
with less than a college education." 14
Studies that relate men's and women's earnings to parental 
characteristics, such as education, exist, though their interpretation is 
complicated by the large number of women not working at a point of 
time. This is less of a problem when studying years of schooling. A 
recent summary of this education literature is given in Behrman and
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Taubman (1985), where some evidence is presented that the father's 
education has relatively larger impacts on the son's success and the 
mother's on the daughter's success.
As noted earlier, Bound, Griliches, and Hall (1986) find that latent 
family effects for the variance of IQ, years of schooling, and the natural 
logarithm of earnings are essentially the same for both sexes. When 
panel data are available for siblings, it is possible to estimate an in 
dividual fixed effect. Furthermore, using sibling panel data, the fixed 
effect can be decomposed into a family effect common to each sibling 
and an individual specific effect. Solon et al. (1987) find that the fami 
ly component shared by siblings and the individual effect not shared 
by siblings are about the same share of the variance in the log of in 
come for both sexes.
Childhood activities may also affect both the amount of schooling 
progenies obtain and their future labor market success. For example, 
for men Taubman (1975) shows that having spent much time on chores 
as a child is associated with about a 10 percent reduction in earnings 
near age 50, but that a large amount of time spent on part-time work 
is associated with a corresponding increase in earnings at the same age.
Generally it is not clear if the parents influence the children's will 
ingness to take part-time jobs or to drop out of work. When child labor 
was common, as in the nineteenth century, there is less of an inter 
pretative issue. Parsons and Goldin (1989) show that beginning in the 
age category of 5 to 10, males are more likely to be at work and not 
in school than females, though the differential varies by children's wage 
opportunities and fathers' wages. 15
As shown in table 3, there are differences in labor force participa 
tion rates 16 between males and females aged 16 to 17. Males are more 
likely to work whether black or white; however, the gender differen 
tial has narrowed substantially over time. Over time, males have par 
ticipated less in the labor force while female participation has increas 
ed. It is not obvious to me if these trends represent parental changes 
in support for their children, parental discrimination, growth in fast food 
and other teenage work opportunities, or extra protectiveness for 
daughters in the past.
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SOURCE U S Department of Labor (1985)
It is possible to extend the story back to slightly earlier ages. Tim- 
mer, Eccles, and O'Brien (1985) use diaries collected from children 
to determine how they spend their time. During the week, boys and 
girls aged 12 to 17 average about 20 minutes a week at market work. 
However, girls spend 40 minutes and boys 16 minutes per week at 
housework, which may have consequences in the future. During 
weekends males and females average about 60 minutes and 25 minutes 
at market work, respectively, while household work averages 45 minutes 
and 1.5 hours for males and females.
A few studies have examined the distribution of financial assets. Men- 
chick (1980) finds that estates are split evenly among daughters and 
sons. In another study, he found that more than 80 percent of estates 
with multiple surviving children are split evenly; hence, little room ex 
ists for gender differences.
Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1989) examine the distribution of 
"help from relatives." They use the Michigan Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics (PSID). The PSID surveyed a random sample of people in 
1968. The same people and split-offs from their household have been 
followed through the current time period. Behrman, Pollak, and Taub 
man studied the average-help-received variable for the period 1982 
through 1984 for children who were less than 18 in 1968 and not students 
in 1984. They found that females receive about one-third less help than
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men, but this amounts to less than $90 per year. Incidentally, they found 
only minor effects of own earnings or parental income on help receiv 
ed from relatives.
There is little evidence of differential treatment by gender of children. 
Would such differences, if found, be evidence of discrimination, and 
is the absence of differences evidence of nondiscrimination? The answer 
to both questions is "not necessarily," for reasons shown in the ap 
pendix to this essay.
Conclusion
In this paper I have examined the little evidence available on the treat 
ment of daughters and sons by parents. Raw statistics on bequests, 
transfers, earnings and educational attainment suggest little difference 
by gender. College expenditure data for Pennsylvanians indicate that 
girls on average go to slightly more expensive schools.
I have also constructed a formal model in which I translate discrimina 
tion into parents caring more for or giving more weight to one child's 
earnings in the parents' utility function. By making some strong assump 
tions, it is possible to generate an equation where we can determine 
if parents discriminate against one sex in the provision of education. 
Based on one U.S. sample, parents care equally for sons and daughters. 
Hence, if there are labor market differences in earnings, they are not 
arising because of parents favoring boys.
NOTES
1 See The Torah- The Five Books of Moses (1962)
2 Recently the increased labor force participation of women with high-earnings spouses had led 
to increased inequality in family income (adjusted for family size) See Danziger, Gottschalk, 
and Smolensky (1989) This suggests a recent increase in skills of the female labor force 
3. See Bishop (1989), who uses data on SAT scores which peaked in the mid-1960s and other 
measures of knowledge
4 For some evidence on this, see Goldm (1990); however, see Smith and Ward (1989) for con 
trary evidence
Discrimination Within the Family 39
5. See Hill and Stafford (1980)
6. See Arrow (1973) for more formal proof.
7. Behrman et al (1980)
8. See Behrman et al (1980) and Behrman and Taubman (1989)
9. Corcoran and Datcher (1981) indicate that much of sibling similarity in schooling and earnings 
can be proxied by a list of parental characteristics such as education, they do not worry how much 
of these effects are genetic or environmental, and sibling similarity omits about half of the genetic 
effect and specific environment provided by parents to a child
10 There may be a bias in his data for our purposes because some members of a birth cohort 
died prior to the 1940 Census the first one used Age-specific mortality is related to education, 
with the more educated living longer, and to sex, with women generally living longer, but birth- 
related deaths may have affected older female cohorts more strongly
11 See Taubman (1975) for some evidence on the effect of going to such schools on male earn 
ings around age 50
12 While the data are not perfect because there are income eligibility limits, there is no reason
to think the percentage above the limits varies by gender
13. The "state-owned" category includes schools such as Bloomsburg It does not include Penn
State
14 In conversation, Stafford has indicated that these results are more reliable than earlier ones
he summarized in this article based on another sample
15. They also suggest parents chose cities to maximize family income, including that for child 
labor, which greatly complicates the analysis since parents' earnings may go down even as fami 
ly income rises.
16. You participate if you have or are actively looking for a job
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Appendix 
Altruism and Investment in Human Capital
This appendix summarizes the work of Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 
(1986). Altruistic parents are those whose utility function depends on their 
children's consumption or income, as well as the parents' own consumption. 
In general, an equilibrium allocation of resources between altruistic parents 
and each child requires that (to the parents) the ratio of the marginal utility 
of parental consumption and the marginal utility of a child's consumption equal 
the ratio of the price of each type of consumption. This also means the ratio 
of the marginal utility of one child's consumption to another child's equal the 
ratio of their prices of consumption goods.
A child's earnings depend on both his or her genetic endowments and home 
and other environments. Parents can influence their children's future consump 
tion possibilities by investing time, money, and affection in them. For simplici 
ty, call these investments the home environment, E^. It is also possible that 
other environmental influences exist, for example, accidents, particular 
teachers, own friends, and the institution of governmental policies not expected 
when parents chose a neighborhood.
Suppose the parent's utility function can be divided into two separable parts: 
parental consumption and children's earnings. We will concentrate on the lat 
ter part. Let us examine the resources (R) devoted just to the child's environ 
ment. Let there be just two children, one of each gender. The parameters of 
the utility help determine the distribution of resources invested in each child, 
but do not necessarily indicate discrimination.
Parents discriminate for or against each child only if the weights they give 
to each child's earnings are not equal. With this definition, unequal education 
or unequal income is not necessarily parental discrimination nor is equal educa 
tion and income a guarantee of parental nondiscrimination.
Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1986) studied the interaction of the parents' 
utility function and the child's human capital function to see how parental 
discrimination may affect the level of schooling and earnings by gender. For 
the functional forms they use, they find that whether or not parents discriminate 
depends solely on the shape of the parents' utility function. Their empirical 
work suggests no favoritism towards males.
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